Past visits
Device key
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Public key registration
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One-shot anchor of your pubkey + creation timestamp to RFC 3161 TSAs and Sigstore Rekor. Closes the trust window between key creation and your first anchored visit โ gives the pubkey an independent public-log proof-of-existence so attackers can't claim a swapped key was the original. Belt-and-suspenders alongside the external fingerprint registration above.
Anchor proxy
DigiCert/Sectigo TSAs don't send CORS headers. Defaults to the InterField-operated proxy at
anchor-proxy.andrew-073.workers.dev; override with your own Cloudflare Worker (recipe in CHAIN-DESIGN.md) or clear to disable. Rekor may work direct without a proxy.Temperature unit
ยฐC
About
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Trashed visits
Site
First offline fix can take 30โ60s. Hold the phone outdoors and stay still.
Operator
Kiln
Feedstock
Weather (optional)
Observer
Visit summary
Duration
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Events
0
Photos
0
Est. size
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Recommended workflow / what each button does
- ๐ Verify chain locally โ sanity-check that this device's chain is internally consistent (event hashes match, signatures valid). No network needed. Safe to run any time.
- โ Anchor (RFC 3161 + Rekor) โ request external attestations of the current chain head from two audited CAs (DigiCert + Sectigo, RFC 3161 timestamps) and Sigstore Rekor (transparency log). Requires network. Each click adds 3 entries to
chain.anchorsโ those are the receipts, not duplicate proofs. Recommended once, when service returns after the visit. - ๐ฆ Export bundle (ZIP) โ package the visit (events, media, chain, anchors) into a ZIP for the recipient. Do this last.
Re-anchoring: safe but rarely useful. Anchoring records an anchor_recorded event in the chain, which advances the head โ so a second anchoring proves a slightly later state than the first. Useful only if you reopen the visit and add events, then want fresh attestations. The original attestations remain valid for the head they covered.